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Introduction
Marx’s labor theory of value can be read, counter-intentionally but productively, as a moral anthropology of commodity exchange in capitalist societies. Using this theory as blueprint I will try to develop a moral grammar of capitalist market exchange involving notions of (qualitative) equality and (negative) freedom – both finding recognition through the allocation of (abstract) property as expression of (social) utility.  I will argue that exchanges in consumer and labor markets carry a presupposition of equitability and an acknowledgement of productive contribution, suggesting a web of balanced reciprocity and recognition. Yet, while this constitutes an implicit promise of justice and respect among free and equal market citizens, it is a promise that cannot be kept because of the inevitable inequality arising from capital accumulation. Against the background of that broken promise inequality and exclusion are also to be understood as structural misrecognition. 
To derive a “moral grammar” from basic economic operations may be viewed as reductionistic. I should therefore emphasize that I do not claim to deduce an all-encompassing explanation of capitalist moralities of exchange. Instead I will outline how some basic structures of commodity exchange by way of implication and presupposition affirm, stabilize and to a degree independently reproduce such moralities once they have been politically and culturally created. It has long been established that the allegedly de-moralized and de-traditionalized sphere of “the economy” is, in fact, culturally constructed and maintained.​[1]​ This has often been ignored in a Marxist tradition that has been generally more concerned with how capitalist relations of production affect subjectivities and culture.  Postmodern Marxists like Jack Amariglio and Antonio Callari​[2]​ try to redress the balance by acknowledging the “mutual intereffectivity” between cultural, political and economic processes. I will not contest the embeddedness of economic processes in non-economic social relations. My focus in this paper will nonetheless be on the internal logic of exchange and its moral implications. That, as Karl Polanyi insists, “a market economy can only exist in a market society”​[3]​ means both that social institutions provide an indispensable environment for the market and that a market society must accommodate the market, i.e. allow itself to be shaped by the market. 
The reason for this focus is that, on the one hand, theorists of embeddedness tend to assume that market exchange in itself contributes nothing to the moral texture of a society – or rather, that it is a major threat to that texture. On the other hand, while the traditions of Western Marxism and the Frankfurt School discuss commodity exchange (and particularly commodity fetishism) as culturally productive, they do so mainly in terms of ideology but not in terms of legitimacy,​[4]​ i.e. they do not so much talk about how commodity exchange creates and affirms webs of mutual obligation and recognition, but mainly how it deforms personalities and distorts realities. Even the broad literature on whether or not Marx had a theory of justice, albeit centering on commodity exchange and particularly the sale of labor power, has not produced an account of how commodity exchange presupposes and reproduces a morality of reciprocity and recognition. Although the role of “immanent” standards of justice is debated, the emergence and reproduction of such immanent standards in capitalist practices is not accounted for.​[5]​ The same is true for the contestation that for Marx “justice” was nothing more than a bourgeois ideology,​[6]​ sanctifying the unconscious “factual recognition” ​[7]​ of property in economic interaction by an explicit legal recognition. Often a Marxist understanding of the normative implications of such factual recognition has been marred by a basis/superstructure distinction that leaves no room for the normative force of routine and practice itself – a normativity that is more immediate and less articulate than full-blown “right” (part of the superstructure), yet not entirely without consciousness like the, supposedly, unreflected relations of production (the basis), but “practically intelligible”.​[8]​ 
The “commodity logic” as a moral grammar informing notions of reciprocity and recognition cannot be understood adequately as mere distortion or disguise of real relations of production, shielding the vested interests of the dominating classes from criticism. To the contrary: While such notions may, at times, have contributed to mass loyalty under Fordist regimes of production,​[9]​ they do not square at all with neo-liberal regimes of accumulation. For this reason ideologues of this new capitalism abandoned the idea of social justice as equitable exchange which had once been an integral part of the liberal justification of capitalism.​[10]​ But the idea, with its potential to destabilize legitimacy of the current capitalist order,​[11]​ retains a high everyday plausibility.
Value theory as moral anthropology
Commodity exchange as a central element of economic life has become a traditionalized practice in the sense that it is “determined by engrained habituation”.​[12]​ This is particularly true of the most common commodity exchanges: selling labor power and buying consumer goods.​[13]​ These have sunken deep into the self-evidence of what Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann call “first level legitimacy”: justification by the mere knowledge that this is “how things are done.”​[14]​  Regularity of conduct is habitually interpreted as moral behavior in the sense that there is a “right and a wrong way of doing things”.​[15]​ The rules and regularities of commodity exchange have become part of the moral grammar of capitalist societies and like the grammar of a language, a moral grammar is acquired not by first learning and then applying its rules but by observing and imitating examples of doing things the right way.​[16]​ 
To spell out those rules, I will use (but not: interpret) Marx’s value theory as a blueprint for a moral anthropology of such habits of capitalist exchange. Marx can be read as incidental anthropologist as, writing in the center of world capitalism (London), he remained a “stranger in the field” – both inadvertently by hailing from an underdeveloped region (Prussian Rhineland) and deliberately by being a communist. From this quasi-ethnographical vantage point he delivered – as a by-product of his critique of the political economy – a dense account of the moral assumptions contained in money-mediated commodity exchange. 
The use of Marx’s analysis of commodity exchange entails an abstraction from the variety and complexity of actual market practices, as of course there is no such thing as “the market” but only a variety of markets.​[17]​ The “labor market”, for example, is highly segmented because what is traded are diverse concrete labor powers attached to diverse concrete people in diverse concrete contexts. Construction workers and hedge fund managers do not sell their labor on the same market. Such different markets have little in common except the evaluation of commodities in terms of general money, which as a real-abstraction implies, I will argue, a reference to abstract, interchangeable labor. Talking of “the market” can therefore be justified insofar (and only insofar) as transactions in different markets in their aspect of quantitative evaluation through money are translatable into each other. Money mediation does not do away with the diversity of specific markets; but it does constitute a shared index that plays a central role in the moral grammar of capitalist exchange.
In reading Marx as an incidental anthropologist, much of the original critical clout of his economic analyses will be lost. However, some of it will be regained as it will emerge that the semantics of capitalist commodity exchange presumes standards which are violoated its outcomes. This is not just a case of an ideological appearance of justice on the one hand and an unjust economic reality on the other; there is a more immediate moral relevance to this discrepancy. Against the background of the moral grammar of capitalist exchange, I will argue, the allocation of economic value is a recognition of personal worth – and the denial of economic value becomes an act of misrecognition. 
Marx had a keen understanding of both the moral implications of capitalist praxis and the contradictions between these implications and the actual results of this praxis. But he did not elaborate on the niceties of what he considered merely to be ideological adornments of a doomed social order. His main concern regarding the morality of capitalism was to warn against mistaking it for a set of timelessly valid principles – a fault he found in many contemporary socialists.​[18]​ Yet the very fact that these principles were inscribed even into socialist theories indicates that they are relevant social realities in their own right. They are so efficacious (and hence real) that, in Marx’s anticipation, distribution in the first phase of communism would still have to be organized according to labor value contribution and thus apply “equal right” in terms of “bourgeois right”​[19]​ – in effect realizing the standard of justice implied by capitalist market exchange but denied under capitalist relations of production. 
What, then, does this capitalist morality consist in? Marx obviously did not value capitalist values very much, so we are left with rather cynical statements - among them the characterization of the sphere of circulation as the “very Eden of the innate rights of man” where “alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham”.​[20]​ In the following sections I will develop these four principles as elements of a specifically capitalistic form of generalized and anonymized reciprocity and recognition. I begin with equality. 
Equality
	‘… and they exchange equivalent for equivalent.’ 
Unlike classical economists such as Smith and Ricardo for whom the equalization of values already was a more or less natural fact, Marx – from his quasi-ethnographical vantage point – still was able to see the oddity of it. As his recourse to Aristotle shows he could still connect to the traditional astonishment about a practice of exchanging qualitatively distinct and different objects as if they were the same.​[21]​ How could this be possible? Marx interprets commodity exchange as one of equal value as constituted by equal amounts of socially necessary labor time. The stumbling-block here is not so much the actual inequality of exchanged labor times​[22]​ – this is quite easily reconciled (both in everyday life and in Marx’s theory) by factoring in intensity and skill which act as multiplication factors of “simple” labor. But even in an exchange of actually equal labor times the cognitive leap of equating the qualitatively different is, in an historic and cross-cultural perspective, a huge one. It requires considerable cultural foundation work from political concepts of equity to religious ideas of substantial identity.​[23]​ The religious/magical history of money feeds into everyday practical understandings of value as a substance “contained” in commodities and money; an understanding that survives the de-materialization of money by imagining a substantial continuity of value, or by actively constructing such continuities by “earmarking” monies according to sources or purposes and projecting their identity through transactions.​[24]​ Marx heavily draws on such practical understandings. In his writings, as Diane Elson points out, commodity exchange appears to be based on the “substantial equivalence” of commodities, with labor as “unifying ‘common element’ or ‘substance’ which the commodities themselves embody”. ​[25]​ The notion of exchange value as “only the mode of expression, the phenomenal form, of something contained in it, yet distinguishable from it”​[26]​ suggests a rather metaphysical explanation of commensurability – a secularized “spirit of the gift”, a modern hau.​[27]​  Cornelius Castoriadis​[28]​ exposes the essentialism of the Hegelian metaphors Marx uses to identify this “substance” of value. According to Castoriadis, Marx puts the cart before the horses as it is not, he contends, the equality of labor that constitutes identity and hence commensurability, but the other way round: When we exchange commodities we make a practical statement about their equality that defies their qualitative difference. The thus stated equality of objects then suggests the equality of a value substance contained in them. Commodity exchange as an equalizing activity imposes commensurability and identity on a non-identical and incommensurable reality. Exchanges emerge on the back of culturally constituted equalizations and identifications, but are then perpetuated through a practice of exchange which in turn presupposes substantial equality.
But why should labor be the substance referred to in this equalization? One could say that it is what most (though not all) commodities have in common: they are the results of or (in the case of services) the immediate expenditure of labor power – “the objectification of a given amount of labour time”.​[29]​ Yet concrete labors are as non-identical and incommensurable as the things they produce – their non-identity is, after all, one of the reasons for the exchange.​[30]​ By “making the arbitrary assumption that there is no qualitative difference between different kinds of labour”​[31]​ the problem of commensurability is merely transferred from products to production.
It is only through money mediation in the labor market that such a counterfactual equation can impose itself. Where the sale not only of products but of the ability to produce becomes the norm (and the most common source of income), labor power comes with a price tag translating it into quantities of any other form of paid labor and its product. The worth of things one can buy, the effort put into producing them, is now directly expressible in the effort one has to make in order to obtain them. Money earned by the sale of labor power becomes “the socially recognised incarnation of human labour”​[32]​ so that “whenever, by an exchange, we equate as values our different products, by that very act, we also equate, as human labour, the different kinds of labour expended upon them.”​[33]​ Only in a capitalist economy in which labor power itself has become the central commodity is it therefore possible that the
purest of absurdities, the rigorous commensurability of kinds of human labour [becomes] a fundamental social reality and thus [acquires], in the imaginary, the appearance of an incontestable objective truth.​[34]​ 
Although it may only appear to be an “incontestable objective truth”, by calling it a “fundamental social reality” Castoriadis concedes that such commensurability is not entirely “imaginary”. The appearance of exchange value refers to an essential value underneath, which is constituted by this very appearance. The ontological claim can be upheld as that of a Searlesian “observer-relative feature” in the sense that “for any observer-relative feature F, seeming to be F is logically prior to being F, because – appropriately understood – seeming to be F is a necessary condition of being F.”​[35]​ As Georg Simmel observed, while value is “subjective” in that it never is a “quality of the object”, social exchange “imparts to value its specific objectivity”,​[36]​ renders it a social fact.
Any qualitative inequality is rendered irrelevant. The fact of mutual exchangeability implies a “homogeneous” or “uniform human labour power” that can be divided into “innumerable individual units”. What is regarded as more highly skilled or effective labor “counts only as simple labour intensified, or rather, as multiplied simple labour.”​[37]​ “Higher” labor simply becomes “more” labor.​[38]​ The equalization of labor further implies a formal equalization of status. The “equality of commodity producers”​[39]​ seems to do away with all qualitative barriers, leaving only quantitative differences that, in principle, appear to be surmountable by individual effort. So, if by working twelve-hour shifts a worker in a garment factory managed to obtain wages equal to the salary of an office worker with an eight-hour day, the two of them would be of equal social standing despite the non-identity of their labor. 
Equality, Inequality… and Recognition
In the process of asserting qualitative equality, however, quantitative inequalities also are affirmed. Unequal distribution appears to be justified by the multiplication of simple labor which constitutes “higher” labor. This lends natural objectivity to unequal evaluations of labor which always are at least codetermined by cultural conceptions and, of course, structures of power and domination. That the hypothetical factory worker would need to work twelve-hour shifts to be equal to the hypothetical office worker strongly affirms the cultural definition of manual labor as inferior. Equalization in commodity exchange translates cultural evaluations of merit based on often very contested notions of skill, effort, commitment etc. into a unified multiplication factor. That those notions are contested disappears in the routine of exchange where the value of labor power is “practically known”:​[40]​ Reading prices backwards one’s money as incorporating one’s labor constantly compares with the labors of all others, exactly stating its relative worth and, by implication, that of the worker as well.​[41]​ This is an inversion of the commodity fetish: Far from disguising social relations between humans as mystical relations between things, these relations between things enact relations of value/worth between people.​[42]​ Such evaluation may not be always happily accepted by all market participants – but the onus of justification is on those who contest it as it comes equipped with the normative force of the factual. This observation is supported by research on popular notions both of how income should be distributed and how income actually is distributed in capitalist societies.​[43]​ Reviewing such research, Robert E. Lane comes to the conclusion that, with “the market” being perceived as the natural, neutral and objective mechanism of comparing values 
laymen, like economists, read backwards from rewards, a person’s level of pay, to discover the source in his contribution to productivity – a doctrine of “revealed contribution” similar to the economist’s concept of “revealed preference.”​[44]​
Thus, the equivalence of all commodities in their “total or expanded form of value” as stated in exchange presupposes, constitutes and at the same time reveals the equivalence of labor incorporated in the respective products. 
But if the market price (however it came about) ex post establishes a seemingly “objective” prior valuation of individual productive contributions, would that not render just any outcome of the market process an expression of social justice? Does not whatever the price of a commodity is determine the value perceived as constituted by all the labor that has gone into its production?  In ordinary experience, however, there remains a difference between what a thing is worth and what it costs. Marx’s conception of the relation between value and achieved price as “accidental” in which the latter reflects the former only on average​[45]​ is grounded in such experience: Once value is affirmed in routinized exchange it gains an independent existence relative to, but not wholly determined by, the price. When accounting for the price of a thing (and particularly when the concept is used in contrast of that of “value” or “worth”) we talk about how scarce it is and whether or not there is a high demand for it. When talking about what a thing is worth we tend to talk about quality in terms of use value (durability, beauty, utility etc.) and the nature and amount of work that has gone into making it that use value.​[46]​ The assumption of value constituted by use-value generating work implies laws of variation different from those determining variations in price. One would think of things like progress in the mode of production, variations in the general level of skill etc. These are not necessarily parallel to fluctuations in supply and demand thought to determine prices which change in a more erratic way. The historic disjunction of industrial wages from product prices realized in the market supports the perception of a relative stability of labor value.​[47]​ While product prices tend to fluctuate in the short term, wages change much more slowly.​[48]​ Also, while prices for many consumer goods such as, for example, cell phones or laptop computers are quite volatile, prices as experienced in the “stylized and ritualistic” routines of grocery shopping​[49]​ tend to leave people with relatively stable amounts to pay at the supermarket checkout. As food items are closely linked to the most basic aspect in the reproduction of labor power (eating), their relative price stability contributes to the perception of an inert value of labor power. Market prices therefore appear to float around what is thus established as labor-based value, and any greater variations can be interpreted as anomalies. Most of the time this is surprisingly unproblematic. The market as impersonal, seemingly objective mechanism appears infallible.  As Thorstein Veblen noted, the fact that “the competition runs in terms of money” ensures that “the money unit is the standard measure of efficiency and achievement”.​[50]​ In reverse, however, this means that where obvious efficiency and achievement go underpaid or ‘fat cats’ go wildly over-rewarded people do perceive injustice and misrecognition. Excessive deviations between price and value are seen as “market failure” – a notion which suggests that normally the market would effect prices that match social valuations of useful productive effort and thus recognize both the work of the producer and the work incorporated in the consumer’s money. So, while in general capitalism is, as Alan Ryan puts it, “just-in-appearance according to prevailing notions of justice, but […] unjust-in-reality according to those same prevailing notions”,​[51]​ when certain borderline plausibilities are overstretched injustice-in-reality can be unjust-in-appearance – only that this appearance supports the justice-in-appearance of the “normal” cases.
If one considers the importance of earned income for self-esteem​[52]​ it is easy to see that “justice” is about more than the allocation of material resources – however important without doubt these are. Underpayment is perceived as (and in fact is) misrecognition; and overpayment can be scandalized as distorting the proportionality of esteem between social positions that are conceived as standing in generalized reciprocal exchange. They jeopardize an economy of respect which, on the one hand, includes recognition as being on equal footing as contributors of value whose contributions differ only in amount, but not in nature while, on the other hand, this recognition of qualitative equality includes the recognition of relative superiority and inferiority in quantitative terms.
Such recognition is, of course, rather thin and the medium by which it is communicated (money) rather empty. It therefore is not surprising that the recent debate around recognition largely ignores market relations. Recognition is seen as something that is only possible outside and even against the market.​[53]​ Axel Honneth, reintroducing the concept to social theory, concedes that where “simple commodity exchange” prevails “the experience of having an ability objectified is so intertwined with the mental anticipation of a possible consumer that this experience gives the individual an intersubjectively mediated self-worth.”​[54]​ But work, he contends, is now emptied out of such personal meaning, devoid of any true self-realization of the producer,​[55]​ which “reduces the possible relationships of recognition between people to the satisfaction of material needs”.​[56]​ In market exchange, according to Marx, people “exist for one another merely as representatives of, and, therefore, as owners of commodities”.​[57]​ In a theory of recognition recoursing to Hegel, recognition requires more than abstract formal belonging; it requires the concrete realization of self in production, consumption and beyond. Such expectations must be frustrated where recognition is communicated through an abstract medium of exchange. Mediation by commodities and money reduces the scope of recognition, i.e. it reduces what is recognized to a generic notion of social utility that not only ignores the concrete person whose property that utility is, but even the concrete nature of that utility itself. 
I will argue, however, that such a reduced scope should not be seen purely as a loss. For one it can also be experienced as liberation: the recognition of freedom regardless of how this freedom is expressed. Second, precisely through its bleak materialism centering on relations of property and through its assumedly callous utilitarian motivation the scale of such recognition – its strength and reliability – is increased (but so is the potential scale of misrecognition). 
Freedom
‘… both buyer and seller of a commodity, say of labour power, are constrained only by their own free will.’ 
In so far as (and only in so far as) money-mediated exchange abstracts from all other qualities of the commodity owner the exchangers are liberated from expectations that reach beyond the immediate objects of exchange. No matter what else they think about each other, by exchanging they practically assert their equality as market citizens and recognize their right to be different otherwise. As long as it sells it does not matter what the producer produces and how exactly s/he produces it. Relations of production, to the extent they are governed by a commodity logic, involve, in principle, little of the producer’s personality – and hence also dominate little of it. 
This is counter-intuitive in a situation where most people have to sell their labor power, i.e. an integral part of their personality. As Karl Polanyi points out, labor power is only a fictitious commodity which “cannot be shoved about, used indiscriminately, or even left unused, without affecting also the human individual.”​[58]​ To hire it in effect means to hire its owner in person. In order to be alienable it hence needs to be constituted as non-identical with its owner. Invoking the logic of commodity exchange such a sale requires the liberty of the seller; therefore the personhood of the worker – as goes one basic assumption of “possessive individualism” –must not be affected by the sale.​[59]​ Such disaffection, because it is fictional to begin with, must be made a reality through institutionalized safeguards, such as welfare state arrangements, labor laws and systems of industrial relations. Those safeguards are necessary to prevent conditions which, e.g. due to low demand for labor power during economic crises, lead into de facto wage slavery, forcing workers to sell not merely their ability to work but, in effect, themselves as well.  The commodification of work always carries the potential of turning into a commodification of the worker.​[60]​ The material unity of worker and labor power in the process of production and their moral separation in the sphere of circulation are central in the constant struggles around the extent to which employers are allowed to govern workers as persons. This is not only an issue in defining the balance between “work” and “free time”​[61]​ but also in terms of governing workers’ personalities beyond the workplace.​[62]​ Recognition of the freedom beyond work must not, by definition, be recognition of the actual use made of that freedom in the construction of selfhood. It is a “negative recognition” which Zygmunt Bauman describes as “a posture of indifference and detachment”​[63]​ where the wider aspects of one’s personality are not relevant. In turn, the person behind the productive performance is liberated from determination by role expectancies beyond the spatially and temporally delineated workplace. This freedom is not just recognized in symbolic acts but also affirmed in practice by the allocation of money, the ticket to the world of consumer goods conceived as realm of freedom. 
Freedom acknowledged in negative recognition, of course, can only be “negative freedom” as advocated by Isaiah Berlin,​[64]​ i.e. a freedom that is defined by the relative absence of external constraints – tolerance as indifference that could well be seen as part capitalist alienation. As Simmel pointed out, the “lack of character” of money is responsible for unprecedented freedom as much as for the psychopathologies that accompany alienation.​[65]​ Marx himself celebrated such “alienation” as a precondition for the self-conscious association of free individuals that is communism.​[66]​ With the demise of the, from an historical distance seemingly, romantic pre-capitalist communal relations the stifling “engulfment” in traditions and personal dependencies also has receded. As Gerald Cohen puts it: “Alienation is the cost of rescue from envelopment by this natural and social environment which is man’s estate before capitalism.”​[67]​ And while alienation has been the object of much Romantic lamentation, no other social system has offered greater room for romantic self-expression than has capitalism. It provided the negative liberty which was championed by the Romantics’ “passionate, fanatical, half-mad doctrine that insists on the absoluteness of the self” which “is forced – to maintain the social possibility of self-actualization – to opt for minimum impact tolerance.”​[68]​ 
On the other hand, such negative liberty entails a rejection of freedom as political self-governance which in this perspective is, in John Stuart Mill’s words, “not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest”.​[69]​ It is all about individual choice and expression as idolized in consumer culture,​[70]​ not about collective self-determination.​[71]​ One could, of course, argue that choosing as a consumer is the equivalent of casting a vote. But in such argument “[u]nequal pocketbooks at the store” are, as Evan Watkins puts it, falsely presented “to mean the same thing as equal pocketbooks at the ballot box”.​[72]​ It is this inequality (and not in its negativity, “shallowness,” etc.) that is the deficiency of negative freedom under capitalism. The freedom of the less well off is a much smaller one than that of those with greater spending power. If such a negative concept of freedom implies that its only limit is the obligation of “not injuring the interests of one another; or rather certain interests, which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as rights”​[73]​, then in a society with hugely unequal property rights the freedom of the poor is squeezed into what little space is left by the liberties taken by the rich.​[74]​ This applies to the freedom of movement restricted by private land ownership as much as to the freedom of speech which finds its limits in access to privately owned means of production in the media industries. Inequality translates into a denial of liberty; the potential that lies in alienation then remains un-actualized. Freedom under capitalism, like recognition, is inextricably linked to property.
Property
‘… because each disposes only of what is his own.’ 
The fact that in exchange relations the exchangers recognize each other as legitimate proprietors of the commodities exchanged has been much reflected on.​[75]​ In the following I will therefore mainly focus on the implications of money as medium of this recognition which have not yet been fully explored.
It is well known that misrecognition can have devastating psychological effects. Our existence as self-conscious beings depends on an internalized perception of ourselves through the eyes of others.​[76]​ Acknowledgement by others is indispensable for our sense of self. But recognition also is a reassurance of our membership in a social group – which is, quite materialistically, a precondition for our physical survival and of our position in that group, of our share in social power and wealth. This, to a large part, explains the psychological importance of recognition in providing a sense of ontological security. Recognition therefore needs to consist in more than just words and gestures. Against Honneth’s emphasis on the psychological aspect of recognition, Nancy Fraser argues that purely symbolical recognition which is not also expressed by a redistribution of resources remains empty. Misrecognition and maldistribution are intrinsically linked, since “economic issues such as income distribution have recognition subtexts” and “conversely, recognition issues […] have distributive subtexts”.​[77]​ If recognition is to be a reassurance of membership and position, its symbolic expression must be followed by a material confirmation in the form of a share in social wealth. Economic distribution can, in turn, be read as also symbolically expressing recognition, which is immediately evident in the psychological consequences of unemployment as failure to gain such recognition in the labor market. 
In the capitalist market, “symbolic” and “material” aspects of recognition are more closely intertwined than in any other context. Money received in market exchange immediately communicates recognition of labor that has, by being paid for, been “proven” socially useful. At the same time it ensures the material actualization of this recognition in that it pays for one’s social existence: Money as symbol has “the property of not merely representing, but being exchange value in the actual exchange”.​[78]​ It recognizes one’s work by representing it as equal to others’ work – and it reciprocates this work by giving access to the product of others’ work. The defining characteristic of money is its ability to transform itself into any other commodity;​[79]​ it is pure property – always abstract but always able to take any concrete form. Money thus not only contains a promise of membership and position – it is the kept promise of a share in social wealth and power. 
Equating work and value, the culture of capitalism privileges money “earned” as recognition of social utility valued in market exchange. When institutions and charitable organizations engage in redistribution they often reduce such recognition by avoiding the use of general money – either by “attaching strings” to the money paid out and thereby curtailing its possible uses, or even by distributing specified vouchers or in kind;​[80]​ i.e. by not signing over money as pure property.  
Where earned money is a central medium of recognition, voluntary and domestic labor tends to go under-recognized. Linda Nicholson​[81]​ argued that while Marx acknowledges the reproduction of the worker by unpaid domestic labor as indispensable for the continuation of capitalist production, this soon is forgotten in both the production process of capital – and also in Marx’s Capital. In the valuation of labor power reproduction is accounted for only insofar as it requires consumables to be paid for (food, clothing, etc.), but not as it requires immediate and usually unpaid work (cooking, dressing etc.). But if Marx undervalues reproductive work he thereby reflects a moral economy in which it does not find the same immediate symbolic/material recognition as paid work. Reproductive work draws worth from other forms of acknowledgement, which might be more recognizable as recognition for being more concrete or articulated – such as the semantics of love that surrounds even the commercial activity of shopping as providing for others,​[82]​ or public acknowledgment of the nationally vital role of the mother/housewife.​[83]​ However, both private love and public praise do not come with the same unconditional and immediately realizable recognition as does income from paid work where one’s utility is translated into instant access to the use values produced by others. 
In contrast to other forms of recognition (solidarity, love, rights), monetary recognition between market participants draws its strength from being a callously instrumental recognition of social utility by utility – which is realized because: 
‘The only force that brings them together and puts them in relation with each other, is the selfishness, the gain and the private interests of each.’
Bentham
Capitalistic reciprocity is “instrumental reciprocity”.​[84]​ It acknowledges one personal trait as firmly legitimizing membership and position: social utility defined by market demand. The act of buying testifies that the bought product or service is genuinely wanted or needed; the assumption being that nobody buys for other than selfish reasons.​[85]​ Bought possessions thus symbolize utility. If possessions are “extensions of the self”​[86]​ the utility for myself of the things I can buy with earned money becomes material evidence of my own utility for others. The money which bought them acts as abstract medium translating the concrete use value of my possessions into the concrete use value of my labor power, and back. 
The market as aggregation of individual self-interests becomes a utilitarian field of probation for the producers as represented by their products; the producers experience the translation of their concrete labor into abstract labor, money, as a collective verdict on their social utility. Herbert Marcuse sums up the existentially judgmental side of value realization from the seller’s perspective:
The exchange value of his goods will show him whether or not they satisfy a social need. If he can sell them at or above his production cost, society was willing to allot a quantum of its labor-time to their production; otherwise he wasted or did not spend socially necessary labor-time. The exchange value of his commodities decides his social fate.​[87]​
In the case of success, personal worth is hardly contestable – it is firmly associated with the constant assertion of mutual need among market participants.​[88]​ Failure, on the other hand, constitutes a profound denial of social utility, which is most acute where the commodity is an integral part of the seller’s personality: labor power. Unemployment, ultimately, amounts to a social statement of being unworthy of one’s reproduction costs – an existential rejection, social death. 
Benefits, in contrast to market based income, communicate, if any, recognition not of being needed but only of being needy. They constitute an unbalanced gift exchange in which the recipients cannot adequately reciprocate and are therefore left in an inferior position.​[89]​ As Nancy Fraser​[90]​ points out, to avoid such imbalance in the recognition of needs they must be politically established as rights – rights that are not just charitable and hence revocable concessions but refer back to the struggle for recognition that brought them about.​[91]​  Political struggles around needs mainly emerge where those who articulate needs cannot satisfy them through the market and thus do not have the instantaneous legitimacy of the seemingly self-evident utility of the money owner – a self-evidence that is based on “proof” of being needed and hence is independent of any judgment beyond the ability to produce something someone will buy.
 Monetary Solidarity
With Émile Durkheim’s “organic solidarity” in mind one could think of the capitalist ethics described so far as “monetary solidarity”. According to Durkheim, in order for the division of labor not to result in anomy, it has to fulfill justice criteria similar to those mapped out above: Exchange needs to take place among freely consenting persons and reflect the “quantity of useful labor” contained in the exchanged commodities.​[92]​ But for Durkheim this is only an effect of the well administered division of labor and not in turn implied by practices of exchange themselves. His objection against a solidarity based on exchange is that the exchange relation is not only anonymous but also ephemeral, lasting “never for more than some few moments” so that “when the business has been completed, each one retires and is left entirely on his own”.​[93]​ 
Social theorists responded to this observation by working out what non-market social relations prop up the capitalist economy, keeping in check its inherent atomism and providing it with stability: personal bonds in clan-like enterprise cultures, personal relations in market segments, social capital, personal trust etc.​[94]​ Durkheim and with him the subsequent theory tradition centering on concepts like “embeddedness” or “moral economy” underestimated the normative implications of market practices and money mediation. Money mediation requires trust in the relative predictability of the system of exchange at least as much as personal trust in specific business partners;​[95]​ it entails generalization (interconnection with all other market participants) and permanence (continuity of market relations). Money provides a fabric of promises, obligations, expectations etc. that organize the movement of commodities between people. What Simmel called the indefinitely expanded “length of teleological series”​[96]​ in the money economy constitutes a morally relevant “expanded sphere of action”, which as Natan Sznaider​[97]​ puts it
allows people to enter, independent of their will, into universal moral relationships. The market expands the horizons of people's moral responsibility, which were formerly limited by exclusivist bonds of memberships in corporate groups.
Along these cognitive links money establishes a generalized set of normative expectations by society as a whole and towards society as a whole in what looks like a universalization of mutualized Hegelian lord/bondsman relations:​[98]​ As a producer one constantly has to fashion oneself to social needs expressed by demand in the market. Because subsistence economy is not an option, the ordinary citizen of capitalism is in a position of servitude of debt vis-à-vis society. The “reciprocal and all-sided dependence of individuals”​[99]​ expressed in exchange value constantly recalls the fact that one owes one’s very existence to society. In order to justify and maintain that existence one has to offer one’s services (incorporated in a product or directly as labor power) to the owners of exchange value, i.e. money. As workers individuals are, as Marx put it, doubly free: free to dispose of themselves as they please, but also free of any commodities whose sale could sustain them. Most of us are forced to sell our labor power as the only commodity we can continuously dispose of. In order to live we must, in effect, serve others. In a generalized and anonymized reciprocity like that of the capitalist market society ideally we can choose who to serve, i.e. we are not servants of any particular master. But we have to serve somebody in order to obtain an income that allows us to exist as free individuals outside the workplace. And even if we are in a position to choose our temporal masters (employers/clients), as owners of social wealth (money) each individual master represents the mastership of society as a whole. Anticipating customers’ needs and wants in order to produce use value (or to shape one’s labor power accordingly), one acknowledges an obligation to serve society to which one is indebted for one’s existence. 
The consequence of not serving society in the sense of producing for the market – poverty, dependence – could be seen as a simple matter of cause and effect. But in a social context the effect appears not so much as a mechanical result but as a social reaction, as punishment. Hans Kelsen​[100]​ has shown that historically the idea of retribution is at the root of the idea of causality even with regards to natural phenomena – it is evidently even more pertinent in the social world. Effects are felt as rewards or punishments of causes which are interpreted as desert or guilt. Social sanctions for inaction imply that there is an obligation towards society to be active. As Talcott Parsons observed, a transgression against “a going system of social relationships” does not require “positive disruption”, i.e. an active violation of the rights of others – a simple withdrawal is sufficient as it forces role partners “to do without the benefits expected from a person’s actions”​[101]​. In the situation of a generalized and anonymized reciprocity as it presents itself in the capitalist market economy, i.e. a situation where potentially everybody is everybody else’s “role partner”, the sanctioned necessity to produce constitutes an obligation to serve society.
Once the debt is (temporarily) repaid, one can (again: temporarily) take on the role of the master as autonomous consumer – the ever recurring bondage is rewarded by an evanescent lordship. Now all other commodity producers look up to the consuming subject as master to be served. Their commodities submissively cast “wooing glances” at one’s money.​[102]​ 
As long as one needs money to pay the bills, buy food etc., money owned by others is like an IOU signed by the individual to society – to be paid off by socially useful labor. But money in one’s own pocket also works as such an IOU, or rather: a WeOU, a bill of exchange; only this time it is one issued by society to the money-owning individual. Modern money developed out of bills of exchange that had become de-personalized, freely tradable​[103]​ – a generalization that turns them into a promise of reciprocation by the market as a whole.​[104]​ Each commercial advertisement reads like a pledge of servitude, a confirmation of the consumers’ sovereignty. Consumers experience the value of their own work incorporated in their money as commanding that of others through, in Adam Smith’s words, “the toil and trouble … which it can impose upon other people”.​[105]​ Of course, if one’s contribution fails to earn more than the most basic needs or if the experience as a consumer is that one can afford much less than others, such denied access to social wealth communicates denied recognition. The recognition function of advertising then turns into one of misrecognition and symbolic exclusion.
Money, as a store of value, also gives permanency to those relations of debt. As not yet actualized potentiality​[106]​ money projects social relations of production and consumption into the future as “the real satisfaction or utility to be gained from an exchange from the point of view of those being paid comes with re-exchange of the money at some future date, probably in another place”.​[107]​ The growing indebtedness through consumer credits, mortgages etc. further deepens the already existing anonymous and generalized servitude of debt, permanently committing the indebted to maintaining their social utility.
Monetary solidarity transcends the ephemeral and atomized nature of commercial exchanges as a web of generalized and anonymous mutual commitment. However, it is not, and can not be, one of balanced reciprocity and equal exchange – even though it projects this as its ideal. As Marx says, the “ideal form of bourgeois society” is an “inverted image” of its reality.​[108]​ But this inverted image is nevertheless a significant element of capitalist reality. It is a moral fact which is presupposed by capitalist reality, implied in its everyday practices, and hence a constituent part of it. It lends legitimacy to a degree of inequality of both wealth and esteem – but it also poses an obstacle to the ideological defense of ever-increasing inequalities driven beyond any plausibility by the dynamics of capital accumulation.
Capital Accumulation 
The defining element of capitalist relations of production is the pervasive commodification of labor power. It is the purchase of labor power that transforms monetary wealth into capital. This is possible because labor power has a very “specific use value”, which consists in “being a source not only of value, but of more value than it has itself”.​[109]​ It takes – even with all historical and cultural allowances – less labor to reproduce labor power than one can extract from it in the labor process. Apparently without any injustice to the worker​[110]​ the capitalist can bag a surplus value realized by the sale of the product to which – having already sold the labor power that produced it – the worker has no right of ownership whatsoever. This leads to an ever increasing inequality of wealth; even if the starting positions had been ever equal they soon would have been knocked off balance. 
As this growing inequality does not stand in any relation to the capitalist’s own labor input, the wealth amassed in capitalist accumulation opens up a secondary field of distribution disconnected from the meritocratic justice expectations of primary distribution according to productive contribution​[111]​ – this money can be used to re-invest, i.e. further productive accumulation, or just to gamble with in a “zone of indifference”.​[112]​ The role of production disappears as the formula of accumulation M-C|C’-M’ is cancelled down to M-M’, i.e. money miraculously begetting more money. This amounts to a magico-religious promise of absolute wealth​[113]​ to be achieved by what Thorstein Veblen called “pecuniary prowess” rather than by productive effort – “achievement” is sidelined by “success”.​[114]​ 
But despite being decoupled from the sphere of production this wealth, as spending power, still commands production, heavily influencing what counts as “social need” by constituting a disproportionate  share of the demand.​[115]​  And since market demand is determined by “income distribution – which in turn is a reflection of the relations of production,”​[116]​ the ideal of a balanced alternation between the roles of “lord” and “bondsman” never is achieved. The central moral problem here is not just one of inequality in wealth but that this inequality translates into domination and servitude​[117]​. 
This power of capital is not only based on the ability to redistribute material wealth and thereby entice (or force) people to work. The value stored in money has a moral element and those able to spend it do not only distribute social wealth – and freedom – but also recognition of social utility, moral worth.​[118]​ Asymmetrical distribution, therefore, entails “asymmetrical conditions of recognition”: In the absence of collective solidarities balancing out a lack in monetary recognition with more traditional forms of recognition in family networks, class cultures etc., this asymmetry leads to “new forms of social suffering” such as low self esteem and fragile identities fuelled by a constant fear of failure.​[119]​ Capitalist relations of production are stabilized not just by a system of material incentives – the promise of wealth – but also by a system of moral incentives – the promise of worth. At the same time it may also be more vulnerable to its moral failure than to its economic failure.
Conclusions
I do not claim that the “ideal form” of a commodity society as network of generalized balanced reciprocity is the moral master discourse of contemporary capitalist societies. Other discourses limit it, compete with it or complement it. A racist discourse, for example, is often used to overrun the capitalist legitimacy of belonging through selling and buying in order to exclude people defined as racially or ethnically different from economic transactions or politically de-legitimize recognition gained in the market. Discourses of exclusion also can, of course, utilize the perceived objectivity of the market as evidence for the alleged inferiority of groups who do not achieve in the market. While what constitutes “simple” and what constitutes “multiplied” simple labor always is codetermined by what culturally counts as “lower” or “higher” work, the market equips such culturally preformed evaluations of capabilities based on sexual, racial and class stereotypes with an apparent purely “economic” objectivity. With Beverly Skeggs​[120]​ one may therefore conclude that “exchange value” is a gendered, racialized and classed category in the first place, and that the whole idea of self-interested decision making in the market is part of a construction of male white middle-class rational subjectivity. But the self-interest presupposed by market exchange is not per se “rational” in a bourgeois sense – it allows for all forms of rationality or irrationality. The sole requirement is use value – and use value does not presuppose any such rationality in terms of “sensible use”, “objective material utility” etc. All that is required is the satisfaction of “human wants of some sort or another. The nature of such wants, whether, for instance, they spring from the stomach or from fancy, makes no difference”.​[121]​ Skeggs suggests that it is through use value that the denied affects of those marginalized by and excluded from relations of exchange can be expressed.  She thereby is spelling out a criticism that is inherent in the moral contradiction of capitalism: that it promises equality, freedom and recognition, but then allows dominant groups to define who is worth how much property and freedom, who is a producer of use value and who is not really needed at all.
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